Evangelical Outpost on Leiter/VanDyke

Posted by Ed Brayton on April 7, 2004 08:31 AM

Joe Carter at Evangelical Outpost has jumped into the Leiter/VanDyke fray, in a post filled with misconceptions and illogical statements. He begins:

For a legal scholar and professor of philosophy, Brian Leiter has a remarkably poor grasp of basic logic. For the past week Leiter has been bashing a defender of Intelligent Design theory using his typical rhetorical style of bullying and bluster. Instead of thinking up creative new ad hominem attacks, though, he should be paying closer attention to his reasoning.

At the risk of being pedantic, I have to point out this very common mistake in claiming the ad hominem logical fallacy. An ad hominem, contrary to how seemingly everyone conceives of it, is not merely an insult. Calling someone a jerk is not an ad hominem. An ad hominem is a logical fallacy, so there must be a mistake in reasoning in the formulation. The logical fallacy in an ad hominem attack is in responding to a substantive claim by referring to an irrelevant personal trait of the person making the argument. For example, if I said, "Joe Carter shouldn't be listened to when he talks about ad hominems, look at the way he dresses", that would be an ad hominem. I would be rejecting his arguments based upon an irrelevant personal trait. While Leiter is often rude and harsh in his attacks on people, those are not ad hominems. They may be insulting, but that doesn't make it ad hominem.

Joe quotes this passage from Brian:

The difficulty, however, is that science did not "a priori pick a naturalistic methodology"; it adopted, based on evidence and experience (i.e., a posteriori), the methods that worked: it turns out that if you make predictions, test the predictions against experience, refine the hypotheses on which the predictions are based, test them again, and so on, you figure out how to predict and control the world around you. This is what the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment, and a few other ancient events apparently not covered in Mr. VanDyke's education, were about: the a posteriori discovery of the most effective ways to predict and control the world. This, of course, distinguishes the naturalistic worldview of science from the supernatural view of religion, which is genuinely a priori.
And begins his response:
There are numerous problems with Leiter's reasoning but I will point out just three. The first is that his methodology would lead to conclusions that Leiter himself woudl presumably reject. Take for example the "anthropic principle." We could predict, post hoc, what type of universe would be required to produce human life, but we'd be unable to test the theory (we aren't able to repeat the Big Bang).
Does Joe really think that if we can't repeat an event, we can't test explanations for that event? This would rule out whole fields of science, including the one he mentioned. Big bang cosmology is entirely testable, and has been tested, without having to repeat the big bang itself. Testability requires making predictions about the nature of new evidence, not repeating the event itself. It would also, by the way, rule out the entire field of forensic science, which is used to convict people and even put them to death on a daily basis in this country. By Joe's reasoning, you would have to actually recreate the murder in order to test forensic explanations for the murder. But that's not how it's done, of course. You test the forensic explanation by making predictions. If the bullet came from gun X, then we make predictions Y and Z. If Y and Z are confirmed, the explanation is validated.

He continues:

We could, however, determine the likelihood that the event could have occurred by pure chance. Since the probability of such a series of events occurring by coincidence would be close to zero, we would be lead, by evidence and experience, to the conclusion that the universe was "designed." (To conclude otherwise would require taking an a priori prejudice against supernaturalism.)
I'll take issue with Joe's claim that we can determine the likelihood of the big bang, or the so-called anthropic coincidences, occuring by "pure chance", and I'll challenge him to produce such a calculation. We hear this argument over and over again, but it's never accompanied by an actual probability equation. If you think we can calculate the probability of either of those two things, let's see the probability equation.

It should also be noted here that even if such a probability equation were possible, it wouldn't tell us anything meaningful about whether the event could have occured naturally or supernaturally. The perfect illustration of this is Marshall Berman's example of the rock in the backyard:

Go outside and pick up a small rock. The probability of that rock being on that spot on the earth *by chance alone* is roughly the area of the stone divided by the surface area of the earth, or about one chance in 10 to the 18th power (one followed by 18 zeros). If picking up the stone took one second, the probability of such an event occurring at this precise moment over the lifetime of the universe is now even smaller by another factor 10 to the 18th power! This simple event is so incredibly unlikely (essentially zero probability) that one wonders how it could be accomplished!
Joe continues:
The second reason is that the "what works" approach gives us no reason to believe that our conclusions are true. I may believe, for example, that my dryer contains a black hole that causes socks to disappear. Every time I put a load of clothes in the machine I find that I'm missing a sock. The more I repeat this experiment the more socks I lose, thereby providing sufficient evidence to confirm my theory.
Joe seems to be confusing facts with explanations. Socks disappearing from your dryer would be a fact; the "black hole hypothesis" would be a potential explanation for that fact to be tested. The continued occurence of the fact does not test the potential explanation. Doing laundry would not constitute "repeating the experiment", since doing laundry does not test the explanation at all. In other words, this is an absolutely absurd analogy for how science tests a hypothesis.

The black hole hypothesis could of course be tested in other ways, as black holes have predictable effects. If there was a black hole in your dryer, it would have a quite noticable effect on gravitational pull around the dryer. It would also not be able to distinguish between socks and other types of clothing, since black holes are not conscious entities and would simply obey the laws of physics. Now, Joe might invoke a violation of the laws of physics here and say that this is a magic black hole that only makes socks disappear and doesn't have any other predictable effects. But in doing so, Joe would demostrate for us exactly why science rules out supernatural explanations, because once you allow them, all bets are off - there is absolutely no way to discern true supernatural explanations from false ones. Can you propose a means of distinguishing the "magic black hole" hypothesis from the "malevolent demons" hypothesis or the "mischievous leprauchans" hypothesis? Of course not. In other words, Joe's analogy is a really good argument against his thesis.

Leiter, of course, would claim that we should use Occam's razor and exclude the necessity of the black hole to explain the missing socks. But this would require us to take an a priori position in favor of the principle of parsimony in order to preserve methodological naturalism. My theory would work well enough that I would have no reason to test it further and while it might not be "true", the a posteriori examination of the evidence makes it a plausible explanation. After all, naturalistic methodology doesn't require us to take a priori assumptions about truth.
Leiter would not have to invoke Occam's Razor to distinguish between two explanations here, because Joe's hypothetical explanation hasn't been tested at all, and if it was tested by making predictions about the effects of a black hole, it would be falsified. Joe is pretending that he has two equally plausible explanations that explain the exact same things equally well, when in fact he doesn't have such an explanation at all. He has one very bad analogy that, if made more analogous, would fail miserably as a theory.
The third reason Leiter's argument fails is that he has no justification for excluding other theories or methods that don't rely on methodological naturalism. Just because a method works doesn't mean it is infallible. The method provided us with Newtonian physics, a hypothesis that "worked" well enough. . .until it didn't. Do we regard the theory as having always been an implausible scientific hypothesis just because it was replaced by another? Of course not. The same applies to methods. Just because methodological naturalism "works" (at least sometimes) does not mean that it is the only valid method or that it cannot be replaced. Besides, you can't (without resorting to an a priori assumption) exclude other methods as invalid without allowing them to be tested.
This would be a serious objection if, and only if, there was some means of testing those "other methods", in this case the ID explanation. And if Joe can come up with a testable hypothesis that flows from ID, or a way to falsify ID, he'll be the first to do it.
Leiter's reasoning shows that his bias against intelligent design theory is not rooted in science but in prejudice. By acknowledging that science does not require an a priori submission to naturalism he inadvertenly undercuts his own argument. He can't claim that methodological naturalism is the "most effective ways to predict and control the world" while refusing to allow other methods to be tested.
Again, Leiter is not ruling out ID without allowing it to be tested. He's challenging the ID advocates to put forth a real model with testable hypotheses that flow logically from it and propose a means of testing those hypotheses. But they haven't done that, and I don't think they can. It's not by accident that all of their publishing efforts to this point have been trying to poke holes in evolution. The entire ID argument up to this point comes down to one big God of the Gaps argument - "Evolution can't explain X, therefore God (sorry, the unnamed - wink, wink - intelligent designer that we know nothing about) must have done it". There are no testable hypotheses that flow from that. So it simply isn't a question of anyone "ruling out" ID without testing it, it's a question of there not being any means of testing it. And if the ID advocates think that's false, all they have to do is actually publish some means of doing so, as we have been challenging them to do since at least 1997's NTSE conference. That deafening silence you've been hearing in that regard is quite telling, don't you think?

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Comment #739

Posted by Pim van Meurs on April 7, 2004 10:03 AM (e) (s)

Quote: He can’t claim that methodological naturalism is the “most effective ways to predict and control the world” while refusing to allow other methods to be tested.

Of course this severely misrepresents Leiter’s comments in which he does not refuse to allow other methods to be tested, on the contrary Leiter states it clearly

<blockquote>
Leiter: VanDyke could not have included quotes showing that the philosophers among them think methodological naturalism is an a priori dogma—that’s the issue. Evolutionary biologists pursue a research program predicated on the search for naturalistic causal mechanisms because it’s turned out, as an a posteriori matter, that such a research program produces spectacular results. By contrast, there is no research program with any research or results utilizing supernatural causal mechanisms. That is why scientists are methodological naturalists. Their reasons are a posteriori. It really is that simple, VanDyke’s astonishing ignorance notwithstanding.
</blockquote>

and he quotes Landau

<blockquote>
If so, he might have also noted that Beckwith quotes Laudan [at 25] noting that ID “is inconsistent with methodological naturalism and ontological materialism…[b]ut that fact has no bearing whatsoever on the plausbility of the arguments for ID.” Why does Laudan say that? Because methodological naturalism is an a posteriori doctrine, which means if ID generated any empirical results incompatible with it—it has not, of course—then so much the worse for MN. The problem is purely a posteriori: ID has no research program and no empirical support, so it presents no challenge at all to the reliance on naturalistical explanatory mechanisms.
</blockquote>

ID fails because it has nothing new to add to scientific inquiry, because it is based on faulty approaches. Simple…

Comment #740

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 10:08 AM (e) (s)

<i>At the risk of being pedantic, I have to point out this very common mistake in claiming the ad hominem logical fallacy.</i>

While I agree that Leiter may not have committed such a fallacy in the technical sense, it is the basic purpose of his insults. He attempts to cast doubts on his opponents arguments by demeaning their intellectual abilities. Leiter may be a smart guy but you couldn’t tell if from the way he argues. Strip away the bluster and insults and he rarely has anything substantive to add.

<i>Does Joe really think that if we can’t repeat an event, we can’t test explanations for that event?</i>

No, I don’t. But then, that wasn’t my claim. We may be able to test individual explanations but we cannot test unrepeatable events. That is the problem with your forensic science analogy. While we may be able to confirm whether the bullet came from a particular gun, we are unable to test all the elements that could have been involved in the murder.

<i>We hear this argument over and over again, but it’s never accompanied by an actual probability equation. If you think we can calculate the probability of either of those two things, let’s see the probability equation.</i>

U= The known universe
N= Occurrence of an event necessary for human life to exist

Prob(U)= prob(N) + prob(N1) + prob (N2) + prob (N3)…

<i>The perfect illustration of this is Marshall Berman’s example of the rock in the backyard.</i>

Actually, Berman’s is a bad example since it commits a form of the inverse gambler’s fallacy. Since there is nothing special about each of the events that are being used to calculate the probability, there is no reason to assume the event was unlikely.

<i>The continued occurrence of the fact does not test the potential explanation. Doing laundry would not constitute “repeating the experiment”, since doing laundry does not test the explanation at all. In other words, this is an absolutely absurd analogy for how science tests a hypothesis.</i>

While it may be an absurd analogy and a bad hypothesis, there is nothing in it that violates Leiter’s explanation for how science works.

<i>Now, Joe might invoke a violation of the laws of physics here and say that this is a magic black hole that only makes socks disappear and doesn’t have any other predictable effects. But in doing so, Joe would demostrate for us exactly why science rules out supernatural explanations, because once you allow them, all bets are off - there is absolutely no way to discern true supernatural explanations from false ones.</i>

But in order to get to that conclusion you would have to make an <i>a priori</i> assumption about science, which is precisely my point about Leiter’s silly misunderstanding of how science works.

<i>In other words, Joe’s analogy is a really good argument against his thesis.</i>

No, it is a silly analogy that provides a good argument against Leiter’s thesis.

<i>And if Joe can come up with a testable hypothesis that flows from ID, or a way to falsify ID, he’ll be the first to do it.</i>

That’s hardly the case. Dembski provides a rather good one that uses the bacterial flagellum: “To falsify such a claim [that it is irreducibly complex], a scientist could go into the laboratory, place a bacterial species lacking a flagellum under some selective pressure (for mobility, say), grow it for ten thousand generations, and see if a flagellum—or any equally complex system—was produced. If that happened, my claims would be neatly disproven.”

Comment #743

Posted by Pim van Meurs on April 7, 2004 10:16 AM (e) (s)

Joe misses the point when he quotes Dembski on falsifying ID at the same time exposing that ID is an appeal to ignorance. Note that ID did not propose a hypothesis but rather states a negative. While one can disprove the negative, this does nothing to disprove the concept of ID.

It is easy to get confused by the ‘logic’ of Dembski and it should be a warning not to rely too much on Dembski’s faulty arguments.

I thank Joe for exposing the fallacy of ID namely that it does NOT present ID relevant hypotheses but rather ‘Not Y’ thus ‘X’ arguments.

Comment #744

Posted by Pim van Meurs on April 7, 2004 10:19 AM (e) (s)

Joe: Prob(U)= prob(N) + prob(N1) + prob (N2) + prob (N3)…

Are you sure Joe that probabilities are additive here? Seems that Prob(U) will soon be 1 that way. It’s this kind of sloppiness which seems to prevalent in ID literature. Appeal to vague and absurd probabilities, a confusion of probability with complexity. Of course Joe did not really address how we calculate the individual probabilities in any meaningfull sense. ID seems to suffer quite a bit from such problems, see Dembski’s probability calculations of the flagellum for a good example

Comment #746

Posted by Pim van Meurs on April 7, 2004 10:22 AM (e) (s)

Joe: Prob(U)= prob(N) + prob(N1) + prob (N2) + prob (N3)…

Are you sure Joe that probabilities are additive here? Seems that Prob(U) will soon be 1 that way. It’s this kind of sloppiness which seems to prevalent in ID literature. Appeal to vague and absurd probabilities, a confusion of probability with complexity. Of course Joe did not really address how we calculate the individual probabilities in any meaningfull sense. ID seems to suffer quite a bit from such problems, see Dembski’s probability calculations of the flagellum for a good example

Comment #748

Posted by C.E. Petit on April 7, 2004 10:41 AM (e) (s)

I’m afraid that Joe has misunderstood the distinction between “testable” and “repeatable.” The forensic science example is a good one because:
<ul>
<li>The individual tests have been previously validated through repeatability, AND
<li>The individual tests have been applied under identical field boundaries to a nonrepeatable post hoc condition, RESULTING IN
<li>Individual test results consistent with the previously validated repetitions. THEREFORE,
<li>The “nonrepeatable event” (in this instance, the murder) has been tested by using measuring instruments that scientific inquiry is satisfied will produce repeatable results.
</li></li></li></li></ul>
The inference is that the causation of the consistent result is similar to the causation of the validated, repeatable results.

This can certainly be applied to testing the Big Bang. Not being a cosmologist, I can speak only in general terms; but there is substantial relativistic, nonrelativisitic, and quantum mechanical evidence from quasar shifts, etc. that supports some form of a Big Bang origin. The event itself is not repeatable (or at least I hope not during my lifetime); but the post-event characteristics are.

What I see Joe Carter wanting is a single test that proves or disproves the Big Bang. Given that there is virtually nothing in all of science that is concluded from a single test, this is essentially forcing a negative answer by the form of the inquiry. Instead, science works by accretion of evidence and tests. For example, Michaelson-Morley did not show the quantum-mechanical nature of light; it ruled out the previously accepted theory.

This should surprise nobody; it is the favorite “evidence” method of Philip Johnson—and, for that matter, of the medieval philosophers who spent their time enumerating angels on pinheads rather than paying attention to what the world around them showed.

Comment #749

Posted by DS on April 7, 2004 10:41 AM (e) (s)

Joe,

I realize you may be relatively new to this issue, so don’t take my comments as too condescending. I’m personally glad you’re interested in this discussion, and I hope some of us can clear up any confusion or questions you may have about it.

When one of us (evil evolushunists) ask’s for a testable prediction from the Theory of ID, what we’re asking for is something which the theory predicts DOES exist. Something which must exist, for the theory of ID to be however it is you stated it to produce the prediction…errr…sorry I’m not a very good writer…
And, and if it DOES NOT exist, then the theory is in jeopardy- or at least in need of some tweaking. 
Enough of these failed predictions and the theory might get tossed out.

Falsifiability in other words. What type of evidence could exist, in prinicple, which would falsify the Theory of ID. Come to think of it, what IS the Theory of ID?
Using your example of the flagellum, what could be found in regard to the Irreducible Complexity which would falsify ID?

~DS~

Comment #751

Posted by Eddie Rios on April 7, 2004 10:42 AM (e) (s)

Unfortunately, I think the deafening silence will not be broken any time soon because the essential intent of ID theorists is not the advancement of science but the propagation of their religious beliefs. 

Propagation of one’s religion in itself is not bad nor is it even dishonest.  But when one tries to use empirical methods to prove the existence of one’s god and that as a kind of logical coupe de gras, he/she ends being not a Christian but a prevaricator. 

In my opinion, Fundamentalist Christians would be better off getting back to the basics.  That is nurturing their religious faith and using the attendant betterment of their individual lives to spread their gospel.  They should furthermore abandon this immoral quest of theirs to transform their religion into science.  In doing so, they might regain respect they’ve sought for over two centuries.

Comment #752

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 10:42 AM (e) (s)

Pim,

<i>Joe misses the point when he quotes Dembski on falsifying ID at the same time exposing that ID is an appeal to ignorance. Note that ID did not propose a hypothesis but rather states a negative. While one can disprove the negative, this does nothing to disprove the concept of ID.</i>

Actually, I think that you are missing the point of Dembski’s argument. Either the bacterial flagellum is irreducibly complex or it is not. If the experiment shows that the structure was produced by natural selection then it would prove the ID’s hypothesis was false.

Comment #753

Posted by PZ Myers on April 7, 2004 10:43 AM (e) (s)

Wait a minute. The guy who thinks missing socks means he can argue that there is a black hole in his dryer wants to claim that Leiter has a “silly misunderstanding of how science works”?

As PvM points out, he’s asked for the probability of the simultaneous  occurrences of multiple independent events, and he spits back a vaguely defined formula that <i>sums</i> rather than multiplies the probabilities?

Jebus.

One of the continuing problems with arguing with creationists is the hyperdevelopment of our sense of irony.

Comment #756

Posted by Andrew on April 7, 2004 11:07 AM (e) (s)

How does a person even begin to estimate the probability of event without knowing the alternatives?  If I roll a fair die, I understand that the probability of any one result is 1 in 6, because there are six sides.

But how can one meaningfully estimate the probability of the Universe existing?  Or of the speed of light being c, or the gravitational constant, or the relative strength of the strong nuclear force, or any of the other events supposedly “necessary” for human life?  Until someone demonstrates that it is possible for the fundamental constraints of the universe to have been other than they are, I’m forced to conclude that both p(U) and p(N) are 1.

Comment #757

Posted by Andrew on April 7, 2004 11:11 AM (e) (s)

Joe:

No, you miss the point.  If Dembski were confronted with a specific mechanism for the evolution of the flagellum (which, IIRC, has been done), he would simply conclude that the flagellum is not irreducibly complex and shift the goalposts to some other biological mechanism (clotting, perhaps).

It’s a fun game to play if you’re on the creationist debating team circuit, travelling merrily from church to church and rallying the faithful.  But let’s not pretend it’s science.

Comment #758

Posted by Tom Herbst on April 7, 2004 11:12 AM (e) (s)

Quote:
While I agree that Leiter may not have committed such a[n ad hominem] fallacy in the technical sense, it is the basic purpose of his insults. He attempts to cast doubts on his opponents arguments by demeaning their intellectual abilities.
Close quote.

I’m afraid I must agree with this.  Almost always when a debater directly insults his opponent, it is to suggest intellectual weakness in that opponent or else to suggest that the opponent is so mentally lacking that something must be missing from hiargument.  It is not relevant that the statement “John is stupid, therefore his argument is flawed” never appears; the fact of the insult is enough to qualify as ad hominem.

Quote:
“To falsify such a claim [that it is irreducibly complex], a scientist could go into the laboratory, place a bacterial species lacking a flagellum under some selective pressure (for mobility, say), grow it for ten thousand generations, and see if a flagellum—or any equally complex system—was produced. If that happened, my claims would be neatly disproven.”
Close quote.

That wouldn’t work, actually.  The ID researcher could afterwards claim (indeed, he *must* claim) that the second bacterium was itself designed by the Intelligent Designer, so the experiment was either guaranteed to succeed or doomed to fail, all by original design, and the human researcher’s involvement is irrelevant.  The test as Dembski formulates it is not falsifiable.

What is needed to test ID theory is an experiment whose outcome cannot be claimed post hoc to have resulted from original design.  However, any life form on Earth 9or any lifeform created by humans) would by definition lack this required purity.

~Tom ~

Comment #760

Posted by DS on April 7, 2004 11:16 AM (e) (s)

BTW Joe,

There’s no way you can answer everyone so don’t bother trying, or you’ll be in here typing all day.

Pick out one or two folks, one or two topics, and stick with them.

~DS~

Comment #762

Posted by Paul Orwin on April 7, 2004 01:00 PM (e) (s)

Have to agree with PZ and others above, this argument from the Anthropic Principle bugs me greatly.  Aside from the ridiculous misunderstandings of probability theory (independent probabilities being multiplied) there is no good reason to assign them independent probabilities.  To go to the rock analogy cited above, the event in question isn’t “picking up this rock” but rather “picking up a rock”.  Since you had no parameters for the rock in question, the probability of picking up a rock can be defined as the probability of happening upon a rock (approx. the amount of the earth’s surface containing rocks, expressed as a ratio to total surface area (dry)) multiplied by the probability of picking up the rock (1). You can build, in this manner, a set of conditional probabilities for different rocks (flat, round ones near a lake, eg).  It is a gross oversimplification to suggest that the big bang state probabilities (i.e. the probability of the grav. constant being 6.67x10^-11, the speed of light being c, etc) are independent.  It is equally hard to identify alternatives (c-1?), and assess their probabilities.  If and when a comprehensive grand unified theory (GUT) is presented, it *might* make some of this more clear. 
It has always seemed to me that a tautological explanation for the state of the universe is the most parsimonious.  The universe is the way it is because, if it we’re different, we would see it differently.  The universe is uniquely set up to support life like us because if it weren’t, we wouldn’t be here talking about it.

Comment #763

Posted by Jim Harrison on April 7, 2004 01:17 PM (e) (s)

ad hominem arguments are inevitable in a discussion of ID. If you meet somebody who thinks that they’re really a two-ton cat person from the planet Schwartz, it’s hardly surprising if you’re more interested in figuring out what’s the matter with the guy than in trying to figure out how to refute his “theory.”

Comment #764

Posted by Reed A. Cartwright on April 7, 2004 01:24 PM (e) (s)

Joe,

Please explain how you can calculate the probability of an event from a sample size of 1?

Comment #765

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 02:45 PM (e) (s)

While I’m working on answering some of the other questions I have to ask an honest question. Is this doubting of the weak anthropic principle just a ploy to get me bogged down in defending a rather uncontroversial point or is there really a disagreement that the principle is valid? (Since I doubt that so many people who are familiar with science would not have heard of the WAP I have to assume that it is an intentional distraction from the main argument.)

Comment #766

Posted by PZ Myers on April 7, 2004 03:01 PM (e) (s)

The Anthropic Principle is consistently over-interpreted, misapplied, over-extended, and mangled beyond recognition by creationists. It is <i>not</i> any form of scientific evidence in favor of a god-like intervention in the creation of the universe.

I also recommend that you avoid getting bogged down in it. It’s a waste of time.

Comment #767

Posted by Reed A. Cartwright on April 7, 2004 03:18 PM (e) (s)

Personally, I prefer the Pants Principle, which holds that everything exists in the universe for the sake of pants.

In fact it can be shown that God more than likely created for pants rather than for humans.

U = The known universe
Ni = Occurrence of an event necessary for human life to exist
Mj = Occurrence of an event necessary for pants

Prob(U)= prob(M1)*prob(M2)*prob(M3)*prob(M4)*…*prob(Mm) = prob(N1)*prob(N2)*…*prob(Nn)*prob(Mn+1)*…*prob(Mm)

Since a universe for pants must also be suitable for humans, a universe for pants is less likely than a universe for humans; therefore, pants are more likely to be the purpose of creation than mankind.

Because of this, I used to be jealous of pants, now I just accept my place in creation.

Comment #769

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 03:58 PM (e) (s)

P.Z.,

<i>I also recommend that you avoid getting bogged down in it. It’s a waste of time.</i>

Agreed. So let’s get down to business.

Please explain how naturalistic methodolgy is able to empirically distinguish between natural phenomena that is produced by an undirected natural causes and that which is produced by intelligent causes.

Comment #770

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 03:59 PM (e) (s)

Sorry. I sent that before it was spellchecked.

Comment #771

Posted by PZ Myers on April 7, 2004 04:02 PM (e) (s)

Errm, aren’t you the one who is supposed to be telling us how ID does that?

Comment #772

Posted by Matthew Heaney on April 7, 2004 04:20 PM (e) (s)

When asked for a way to falsify the ID hypothesis, Joe said:

<i>That’s hardly the case. Dembski provides a rather good one that uses the bacterial flagellum: “To falsify such a claim [that it is irreducibly complex], a scientist could go into the laboratory, place a bacterial species lacking a flagellum under some selective pressure (for mobility, say), grow it for ten thousand generations, and see if a flagellum—or any equally complex system—was produced. If that happened, my claims would be neatly disproven.”</i>

This is of course a silly test.  A bacterium doesn’t try to grow feet or a tail.  The only thing it tries to do is become two bacteria!

The point is that the environment in which a bacterium lives doesn’t select for a flagellum specifically or even for mobility.  Rather, it selects for (any) traits that confer a reproductive advantage.  (Think of all the fauna that make a living as slow and lumbering, or indeed don’t move at all.)  In the space of ways bacteria are able to make a living, having a flagellum is merely one (small) possibility.  (Aren’t there kinds of bacteria without a flagellum?  How do they solve the motility problem? Would that count as a falsification of Dembski’s test? How “equally complex” does the motility system need to be, exactly?  And how do you even measure that?)

The fact that a bacterium has a flagellum depends on a Vast (see Dennett) number of contingent (see Gould) events.  For a more concrete example, read about the devilishly hard time Dawkins had reproducing his chalice biomorph (see Blind Watchmaker).

Comment #773

Posted by Mark on April 7, 2004 04:21 PM (e) (s)

If the sky opened up and a big guy’s face came down and said, “watch!”, and produced neat new animals together with fake fossils, and did other cool magic tricks and explained away a lot of pretty major coincidences, I’d be sold!

Comment #774

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 04:37 PM (e) (s)

<i>Errm, aren’t you the one who is supposed to be telling us how ID does that?</i>

Um…no. If you read my original post it was disputing Leiter’s contention that naturalistic methodology does not take an <i>a priori</i> stance toward naturalism.

Am I correct in assuming that since you avoided my question that you don’t have an answer?

Comment #776

Posted by Ed Brayton on April 7, 2004 04:45 PM (e) (s)

<i>Please explain how naturalistic methodolgy is able to empirically distinguish between natural phenomena that is produced by an undirected natural causes and that which is produced by intelligent causes.</i>

It seems you want to “avoid getting bogged down” by completely changing the subject. The subject of this post was my fisking of your post; if you scroll up, you’ll see it. There were several things at issue, including your obvious misunderstanding of how science operates. Specifically:

1. You claimed that merely observing the fact to be explained provided proof for a possible explanation of that fact. This is patently false.

2. You erroneously claimed that if you can’t reproduce an <b>event</b> you can’t test an explanation for that event.

3. You claimed that only Occam’s razor would distinguish the “black hole in the dryer” hypothesis from a natural explanation, when that is obviously not the case.

In addition, you offered a very poor probability equation for which you cannot possibly know all of the variables. Which means, essentially, there is no legitimate probability equation at all. Several people in this thread offered critiques of why that is. You didn’t respond at all.

Lastly, you offered a “test” for ID that proves that ID is not a real model at all, but only a negative argument from ignorance - “not evolution, therefore ID”.

All of these criticisms have been made and supported in this thread, and you have responded to none of them. But now you want to change the subject to something entirely different. How scientists would discern designed objects from undesigned objects has no bearing on either A) whether Leiter was correct about MN being a posteriori, or B) whether ID can discern <b>supernatural</b> design from non-design. I daresay your zeal to avoid being bogged down really means a desire to avoid answering all of the reasons why the arguments you’ve made so far are poorly reasoned and invalid.

Comment #777

Posted by Mark on April 7, 2004 04:52 PM (e) (s)

<i>Am I correct in assuming that since you avoided my question that you don’t have an answer?</i>

That <i>was</i> my answer.  Those easily conceivable observations <i>would</i> convince me that ID was correct.  And if I’d grown up seeing a big sky guy do magic tricks all the time, I would be very doubtful of naturalistic explanations.  The fact that I regard ID explanations as immensely improbable is not an a priori commitment but is due to the evidence of the actual course of my experience—-it is a posteriori.  I think every other “naturalist” is the same as me in that respect. 

No doubt ID fans think naturalists underestimate the probability of ID explanations given the evidence.  But that has nothing to do with naturalism being a priori. 

I myself don’t care a whole lot if they teach my kids ID. My kids are smart enough to survive that. Heck, I had to go to Sunday school. :-)

Comment #779

Posted by Jason on April 7, 2004 04:56 PM (e) (s)

At risk of sounding naive in this matter, what is the point of debating ID?

First, let me say that I do think that ID is just a way to get religious folk to force God/Allah/[insert intelligent designer here] into science.

Second, I am very religious.  I’m also a physics major (well, I’m switching it to a minor soon, but I took the classes).

The reason I ask this is because whether or not ID is responsible for the universe, physics works.  Any purported “miracle” doesn’t negate physics.  And if there were no ID, physics still works.

I think it is important to note that I don’t believe in a 6-day creation (the original hebrew of Genesis doesn’t even say “day”), nor that creation was <em>ex nihlio</em> (sp?) (the original hebrew has a different connotation for “created” that falls closer to the word “organized”).

From the above, I would ask: why couldn’t evolution just be one of the tools “the designer” used to create life?  Why isn’t the big bang the catalyst necessary to “organize” the existing parts of the universe into what we live in and examine today?  And, to restate my first question, does it <em>really</em> matter to the progress of science anyway?

Comment #780

Posted by Paul Orwin on April 7, 2004 05:07 PM (e) (s)

Matthew Heaney finally asks questions I can answer (except possibly the last one):
(quote)
In the space of ways bacteria are able to make a living, having a flagellum is merely one (small) possibility. (Aren’t there kinds of bacteria without a flagellum? How do they solve the motility problem? Would that count as a falsification of Dembski’s test?
(endquote)
Many bacteria have flagella, but whole large groups do quite well without them.  A great many are non-motile (a discussion of the value of motility is probably outside the bounds of the panda’s thumb comments), relying on the forces of nature and man to carry them from place to place.  Others use notably cool motility mechanisms, such as producing surfactants (detergents) that they float over a surface on, pili that they use to pull themselves along a surface, or glide by mysterious means (here’s a cool site with a bunch of<a href=”http://www-micro.msb.le.ac.uk/video/motility.html…“>motility</a> info).
In fact, if I had to sort of distill it down to its essence, I would probably call bacterial motility, in its glory and variety, a great example of evolutionary adaptation.
Since Dembski’s test, to the best of my understanding, is bunk, I am not sure that this qualifies as falsification of it, but I think the flagellum and motility in general is a tremendously bad example of “intelligent design”, and a nearly perfect example of adaptation to niches and evolution.  The whole debate is spookily similar to the old “half an eye” debate I remember reading about in Skeptic magazine as an undergraduate.  Santayana, anyone?

Comment #781

Posted by Paul Orwin on April 7, 2004 05:11 PM (e) (s)

BTW, here is the video I was looking for of Neisseria gonorrheae (gonococci to those in the know) crawling using their pili, long cylinders of pilin protein that protrude from their surface.
<a href=”http://www.webcom.com/alexey/moviepage.html…“>motility movies</a>
This was published in nature in 2002.

Comment #784

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 05:40 PM (e) (s)

Ed,

<i>There were several things at issue, including your obvious misunderstanding of how science operates. Specifically:

Since you appear to have completely missed my point, I’ll concede that my sloppy writing resulted in your your fisking a strawman rather than my real argument.

<i>1. You claimed that merely observing the fact to be explained provided proof for a possible explanation of that fact. This is patently false.</i>

No, actually it’s not if we use Leiter’s criteria. But my point was that we would still have no reason for determining whether the absurd hypothesis was either true or false. 

<i>2. You erroneously claimed that if you can’t reproduce an event you can’t test an explanation for that event.</i>

Admittedly, my wording is a bit sloppy (I wrote the post at 1 a.m.) but what it is intended to claim was that since we can’t repeat the Big Bang we are unable to tell if different  conditions (of the anthropic principle) would still produce the same outcome (human life).

<i>3. You claimed that only Occam’s razor would distinguish the “black hole in the dryer” hypothesis from a natural explanation, when that is obviously not the case.</i>

I made no such claim. What I said was that it would produce a plausible hypothesis and since Leiter’s methodology doesn’t require the hypothesis to be true, it certainly fits the criteria.

<i>In addition, you offered a very poor probability equation for which you cannot possibly know all of the variables. Which means, essentially, there is no legitimate probability equation at all. Several people in this thread offered critiques of why that is. You didn’t respond at all.</i>

I had assumed that the WAP was a relatively non-controversial theory. If that is not the case then I will concede the point and move on since it really has little to do with my main point.

<i>Lastly, you offered a “test” for ID that proves that ID is not a real model at all, but only a negative argument from ignorance - “not evolution, therefore ID”.</i>

No, what I provided was a test that, while it would have the ability to falsify ID, would not necessarily prove it was true.

<i>But now you want to change the subject to something entirely different.</i>

This is not “changing the subject” since it was the purpose of my main post. Methodological naturalism takes an <i>a priori</i> stance toward philosophical naturalism. 

<i> How scientists would discern designed objects from undesigned objects has no bearing on either A) whether Leiter was correct about MN being a posteriori, or B) whether ID can discern supernatural design from non-design.</i>

Of course it would. If MN is strictly based on a posteriori reasoning then there must be some way to tell what has been designed from an intelligent cause and what is the result of completely naturalistic causes.

<i> I daresay your zeal to avoid being bogged down really means a desire to avoid answering all of the reasons why the arguments you’ve made so far are poorly reasoned and invalid.</i>

This is the main point of my argument. If you cannot or choose not to rebut it then simply concede that I was right about Leiter and we can move on to other topics.

</i>

Comment #785

Posted by PZ Myers on April 7, 2004 05:41 PM (e) (s)

Tsk, tsk, Joe. You’re the one trying to argue that ID has some intellectual standing, not me, and you’re the one who argues that ID can answer the question.

I know how I would determine if something was built by intelligent design: I’d watch it being built. I’d figure out the process. If it builds itself with no outside intervention, using the ordinary principles of physics, chemistry, and biology, I’d say that there is no need to invoke celestial forceps wielded by industrious angels.

Your turn.

Comment #787

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 05:53 PM (e) (s)

<i>Tsk, tsk, Joe. You’re the one trying to argue that ID has some intellectual standing, not me, and you’re the one who argues that ID can answer the question.</i>

Contrary to what you might think, I don’t automatically assume that ID is true. But unless you assume that naturalism is not only true but beyond question, then you have to allow other explanatory theories to compete on the same playing field. ID may be complete bunk but it should be given a fair hearing so that an adequate judgement about its merits can be made.

<i>I know how I would determine if something was built by intelligent design: I’d watch it being built.</i>

How would you “watch something be built” if it were a  biological process?

<i>Your turn.</i>

Actually, I think you should take another shot at it.

Comment #789

Posted by PZ Myers on April 7, 2004 06:02 PM (e) (s)

How would I “watch something be built” if it were a biological process? Joe, I’m a developmental biologist. I do it every day.

<a href=”http://pharyngula.org/gallery.php?galleries/newmovies/color.…“>Here you go.</a> Watch the pretty zebrafish assemble itself.

Comment #790

Posted by Reed A. Cartwright on April 7, 2004 06:08 PM (e) (s)

The problem is, Joe, that you don’t have <i>explanatory theories</i> unless you use methodological naturalism.  Scientists realized a few centuries ago that supernatural explainations actually explained nothing.  Natural explainations can be tested, refined, and improved.  Supernatural explainations cannot.

If you disagree with this, how about proposing a way to objectively distinguish between these two competing supernatural explainations for rainbows and determine which one is more wrong than the other one.

1) They exist because leperchauns need a place to hide their gold.

2) They exist because YHWH promises not to destroy the earth again.

Comment #793

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 06:38 PM (e) (s)

Reed,

<i>The problem is, Joe, that you don’t have explanatory theories unless you use methodological naturalism.</i>

I disagree. Forensic science provides explanatory theories and it doesn’t rely on methodological naturalism.

<i>If you disagree with this, how about proposing a way to objectively distinguish between these two competing supernatural explainations for rainbows and determine which one is more wrong than the other one.</i>

Those are not explanations for how rainbows are produced but rather reasons why they might exist.

Comment #796

Posted by Ed Brayton on April 7, 2004 06:45 PM (e) (s)

<i>I disagree. Forensic science provides explanatory theories and it doesn’t rely on methodological naturalism.</i>

Huh? It doesn’t? Can you name a single instance in which a forensic examiner has ever hypothesized a supernatural explanation for a crime, like ghosts or demons or leprauchans? Of course you can’t. They limit themselves to naturalistic explanations because <b>there is no way of testing any other type of explanation.</b> For crying out loud, you seem to have nothing even approaching a coherent point of view on these issues. You don’t know what testability means, you confuse facts with the explanations for them, you think events need to be tested, and you think that methodological naturalism rules out any and all intelligent actions. Frankly, you’re just clueless on this entire issue.

Comment #797

Posted by Andrea Bottaro on April 7, 2004 06:52 PM (e) (s)

“Ed: In addition, you offered a very poor probability equation for which you cannot possibly know all of the variables. Which means, essentially, there is no legitimate probability equation at all. Several people in this thread offered critiques of why that is. You didn’t respond at all.

Joe: I had assumed that the WAP was a relatively non-controversial theory. If that is not the case then I will concede the point and move on since it really has little to do with my main point. “

Joe, it looks like you actually are confused about what the WAP is.  First of all, nothing of what you said so far has much to do with WAP.  Second, WAP is not a “theory”.  WAP is essentially a tautological explanation for the apparent fine-tuning of the Universe; it says that no matter how improbable, the Laws of the Universe are such that intelligent observers can develop, because intelligent observers (us) have developed.  It is <i>not</> a probabilistic statement about the likelihood of a fine-tuned Universe, on the contrary, it basically says that <i>all probabilistic arguments about fine-tuning of the Universe are meaningless</i>.  It is not an argument for ID, as you seem to use it, but against it. 

It is not really “controversial” (it can’t be: it clearly is a self-consistent and complete explanation of the phenomenon in question), but is not entirely satisfactory for some in an epistemological/philosophical sense (hence, the SAPs in their various forms, which do take fine-tuning seriously).

Comment #798

Posted by Reed A. Cartwright on April 7, 2004 07:00 PM (e) (s)

<blockquote><p>I disagree. Forensic science provides explanatory theories and it doesn’t rely on methodological naturalism.</p></blockquote>

Joe,

I can’t believe that you just said that.  Do even know what methodological naturalism is?  Methodological naturalism holds that supernatural forces, e.g. miracles, do not affect scientific observations and experiment, i.e. only natural events, things that can be studied and tested, are responsible for what is being studied.

<i>Everybody</i> is a methodological naturalist one way or another.  Let’s say that you are hungry for a Big Mac, but your wallet is empty.  Do you A) go to an ATM and withdraw $20 or B) skip the bank and pray that angels will slip a twenty in your wallet while you drive?  If you do the former, you a making a decision based on methodological naturalism.  If you chose the latter, you will soon find out while methodological naturalism works.

Now if you still think that forensic science doesn’t use methodological naturalism, please demonstrate where it has allowed supernatural explainations for criminal events.

<blockquote><p>Those are not explanations for how rainbows are produced but rather reasons why they might exist.</p></blockquote>

You didn’t answer my question.  Now please propose a way to objectively distinguish between the two competing supernatural explainations for rainbows and determine which one is more wrong than the other one.

Comment #799

Posted by Geoff on April 7, 2004 07:17 PM (e) (s)

I find this argument about whether or not the commitment to methodological naturalism is “a priori” sort of bizarre.  (a) is either true or false:

(a) Naturalistic explanations of phenomena are generally better* than supernaturalistic explanations of those same phenomena.

That it’s true is just so blazingly obvious that I can’t imagine anybody quarrelling with it.  But if it’s true, then methodological naturalism doesn’t involve <i>a priori</i> reasoning—doing something because it works better than the alternatives is as <i>a posteriori</i> a reason for doing it as there is.  Help me understand what I’m missing.

*=more liable to be right, more satisfying, simpler, more elegant, more reliable, prone to yield more testable hypotheses, more profitable, more practical, more beautiful, more conducive to enabling people to do cooler stuff, <i>whatever</i>.  Pick a way an explanation can be better than another and plug it in.

Comment #800

Posted by Ed Brayton on April 7, 2004 07:17 PM (e) (s)

Joe, on his webpage tonight:

<i>Leiter has repeatedly stated that proper scientific methodology particularly “naturalistic methodology) relies on a posteriori rather than a priori reasoning.</i>

No Joe, Leiter has argued no such thing. Leiter has argued that science decided to use methodological naturalism - one aspect of the modern scientific method - through the use of a posteriori reasoning, not a priori reasoning. In other words, scientists didn’t rule out supernatural explanations as a matter of assumption, it ruled out supernatural explanations for two reasons:

A. Because history has demonstrated over and over again that supernatural explanations end up being replaced by natural ones. There was a time when virtually every aspect of life, from the weather to illness to wealth to good crops, was given a supernatural explanation - God was either happy with us or angry at us, so he sent good weather/bad weather/a good harvest/a bad harvest/illness/good health. But now we know that all of those things have natural causes. Had we stopped at the supernatural explanations, we would never have found the truth. In other words, methodological naturalism WORKS, and it works better than methodological supernaturalism (MS). So scientists, based upon that history, choose <b>a posteriori</b> to use MN when trying to solve a problem. MN allows for testable hypotheses, MS does not. MN provides fruitful new avenues of research, MS does not.

B. Because there is no alternative to MN. MN allows for a means to test competing hypotheses as explanations through the process of experimentation, prediction and discovery. MS has no such means. Because supernatural explanations are not falsifiable and there are no boundaries on what “might be”, there is no ability to discern true explanations from false ones. Go back to the socks in the dryer. We can pose and test all sorts of natural explanations for it. But let’s take two possible supernatural explanations for it:

A. A magic black hole swallows up only the socks and nothing else.

B. Mischevious invisible imps steal the socks and turn them into gold.

Is there any means you can devise that would test those two hypotheses? Nope. Not even hypothetically. Is there any means of falsifying either explanation? Nope. Not even hypothetically.

So what alternative do you have to using MN in science? Answer: you have none. You have no alternative, and you have no good reason why it’s a bad idea given the history of success that the scientific method has in solving problems. The ONLY thing you can do is point to areas where science doesn’t yet have a complete answer to a specific problem and say, “Ah ha, you don’t have a natural exlanation for it yet, so there must be a supernatural explanation for it.” That’s why the only means of testing ID you could come up with was in fact a negative test of evolution, because this kind of God of the Gaps argument from ignorance is the only basis for a non-natural explanation. But if we had applied that logic throughout history, we would never have solved any scientific problem of explained any set of phenomena in the first place.

Comment #801

Posted by Geoff on April 7, 2004 07:30 PM (e) (s)

Reed: it does seem like Joe’s got a point in his response to your rainbow cases. 

As you’ve stated them, they’re not theories, because they just say what reason somebody might have had for making a rainbow, not what caused the rainbow to exist.  But a supernatural explanation could easily take the latter form, too.  Though you obviously couldn’t run an experiment to distinguish the following two claims, they are both supernatural and represent different explanations:

(1) Rainbows are made by invisible little leprechauns painting the air with magic colors;

(2) Rainbows are made by God’s invisible hand reaching down and putting rainbow dust in our retinas.

Bad theories, but theories.  Your original claim was not just that supernatural explanations are such that it’s awfully hard to see how you could determine which one was better than the others, but that supernatural explanations aren’t <i>theories</i> at all.  But it doesn’t seem, conceptually at least, that <i>x</i> is a theory only if <i>x</i> comes with a procedure for determining whether or not it’s accurate.  A <i>good</i> theory, on the other hand, is a whole different ball game.

Comment #803

Posted by asg on April 7, 2004 07:51 PM (e) (s)

As a fascinated lurker, I must say I am really looking forward to an example of any case in which forensic scientists have not relied on methodological naturalism.

Comment #804

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 08:25 PM (e) (s)

Ed and Reed, 

One of the obvious problems is where we differ on the line of demarcation between what is natural and what is supernatural. You seem to be taking the medieval understanding that the supernatural only concerns such imaginary beings as ghosts and goblins. But I take the more nuanced view that super-natural is anything that is not solely composed of matter and subject to the laws of nature. Under that definition, the human mind/personality would be considered supernatural phenomena.

Before you let loose with a knee-jerk disagreement, let me clarify that the under a strict materialism (which is what you claim that science must adhere to) the mind (as opposed to the physical brain) is an epiphenomenon and not composed of matter. It is, therefore, is an example of supernatural phenomena (or at least preternatural, which would still put it outside the realm of MN).

This is why I claim that forensic science (particularly forensic psychology) is not based on methodological naturalism.

Comment #805

Posted by Timothy Sandefur on April 7, 2004 08:30 PM (e) (s)

I wish to very emphatically disagree with the suggestion that if one believes a) the proper definition of “supernatural is anything that is not solely composed of matter and subject to the laws of nature,” that one must believe that b) “Under that definition, the human mind/personality would be considered supernatural phenomena.” I agree with the defition of the former, and most certainly do not agree with the latter.

Carter’s suggestion to the contrary rests on an equivocation about the definition of “epiphenomenal” which Dennett obliterates in chapter 12 of <i>Consciousness Explained.</i>

Comment #806

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 08:37 PM (e) (s)

Geoff,

<I>I find this argument about whether or not the commitment to methodological naturalism is “a priori” sort of bizarre. (a) is either true or false:

(a) Naturalistic explanations of phenomena are generally better* than supernaturalistic explanations of those same phenomena.</I>

(A) is neither true nor false but contingent on the phenomena being explained.

This entire exercise is to get people to understand that their view of MN is based on an <I>a priori</I> rather than an <I>a posteriori</I> reasoning (we’ll have to come back to the issue of why it matters once this is resolved). Your comment provides an excellent example of what I am referring to. Say for the sake of argument that God exists and that he caused a miracle (an action caused by non-naturalistic means) to occur. Now if we take the assumption that all events must be explainable using MN then we would have to conclude that the event was a natural occurrence even though we “know” this is false.

If we have no alternative to MN and it cannot be used to detect supernatural phenomena then we will have a false explanation for the event that occurred. By sticking to our method we would lose the truth. While we may good <I>a posteriori</I> reasons for believing MN is a valid methodology we would have to concede that it could lead us to believe false theories.

Comment #807

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 08:39 PM (e) (s)

Mr. Sandefur,

I’m confused. In your opinion, is human conciousness composed of matter or not?

Comment #808

Posted by Matthew Heaney on April 7, 2004 08:42 PM (e) (s)

Thanks, Paul, for the motility links.

I thought of some more problems with Dembski’s test.

First of all, why is <i>more</i> complexity a sign of intelligent design?  Why not <i>less</i> complexity?  As any programmer knows, it’s the poorly skilled programmers who write the most complex code.  In contrast, the best programmers write code that is simple and elegant. Complex code is just what you’d expect evolution to write, not an intelligent designer.

The other issue is just how do you judge what constitutes a “better” motility system?  Dembski (really, Behe) is arguing that better means “more complex” (and hence designed), but who’s to say that a simpler system that propels the bacterium just as fast isn’t better?  How exactly do we know that it wasn’t the simpler motility system that was designed instead of the complex one?  Maybe there were two designers.  Maybe there was a team of designers.  Who knows?

(Consider the extreme motility problem for a plant, which can’t move at all.  To “move,” a tree very cleverly wraps its seed inside fruit.  The fruit is sweet, which entices animals (who <b>can</b> move) to eat it, because the sugar is part of their diet.  The seeds are hard, so they pass all the way through the digestive system of the animal, and end up somewhere else away from the tree.  Now, is that motility system more or less complex than a flagellum?  Was it intelligently designed, or not?)

Consider also some of Dawkins’ favorite examples:

<i>He spent some time on how the imperfections of organisms were more revealing, “…not what you would find if life had been Designed.”  Some examples given in word and picture were of the flatfish with grossly distorted skull, having evolved from an upright position to bottom dwelling existence; the eye moving around “Picasso fashion” so that both were on one side.</i>

<i>The male testes was another, where migration of them to their current position caused an extreme elongation of the uretheter as it looped around other structures before getting to the kidney.</i> [This example is also in Tim Berra’s book. —MJH]

<i>The laryngeal nerves that extend into the chest, then reroute around a main blood vessel before going back up was another un-engineered example as was the vertebrate eye which Dawkins demonstrated was actually backwards wired, creating the “blind spot.” The eye evolved many times independently and in not all organisms was this “design flaw” in effect. Correcting these oddities where they presented no real harm would have been “too much upheaval for natural selection” but should have posed no problem, Dawkins maintained, for an Intelligent Designer.</i>
<a href=”http://www.freethoughtassociation.com/minutes/1999/Oct11-199…“>
http://www.freethoughtassociation.com/minutes/1999/Oct11-199…
</a>

Here’s another example.  Suppose we’re playing a game of poker, and I get a royal flush.  That’s a rare event, and I assume it meets Dembski’s definition of “complex system.”  Dembski and Behe want you to assume that a flagellum is like a royal flush.  But there’s nothing special about that hand, except for the fact that it’s rare.  So what?  I could win the game with that hand, or I could lose the game.  I could win that game without getting a royal flush.  In fact, most of us never get a royal flush, but someone always wins the game.  You could win the hand by having just a pair, or simply having the highest card.

The point is that having “more complexity” is not what matters in the game of life.  The only thing that matters is living long enough to get your genes in the next generation.  You don’t need a royal flush to win at poker, nor does a bacterium need a flagellum to win at life.

Dembski’s test to “falsify” the ID hypothesis is analogous to demanding that you play 10,000 games of poker, and then concluding that since no one got a royal flush during the test, that when someone somewhere else does get a royal flush it must be because God made it so.  But we all know that getting a royal flush is just a contingent event like any other (even if it’s not very probable), and that you can win the hand even without getting a royal flush.

And besides, as someone else in this thread also pointed out, even if the scientist were able to breed a bacterium with a flagellum, it proves nothing since you have no way of knowing whether God (oops! I mean the “intelligent designer”) influenced the outcome of the test.  Indeed, if you weren’t able to breed a bacterium with a flagellum then that might simply mean God intervened to make non-flagella bacteria.  What test do you perform to resolve which interpretation is correct?  As they say, you can’t put God in a test tube, or keep him out of one.

Comment #809

Posted by Ed Brayton on April 7, 2004 08:43 PM (e) (s)

<i>One of the obvious problems is where we differ on the line of demarcation between what is natural and what is supernatural. You seem to be taking the medieval understanding that the supernatural only concerns such imaginary beings as ghosts and goblins. But I take the more nuanced view that super-natural is anything that is not solely composed of matter and subject to the laws of nature. Under that definition, the human mind/personality would be considered supernatural phenomena.</i>

Wow. I’m sorry to be so blunt, but that may be the dumbest argument I’ve seen in years. This view isn’t more “nuanced”, it’s just plain ridiculous. You’re using a completely anachronistic definition of “natural” and “supernatural” to make arguments against concepts that no one, other than you, would define that way. Frankly, I don’t buy it. I think you’ve just found yourself on the giving end of so many dumb statements that have resulted in your arguments getting beaten like a pinata that you’re just grasping for any straw you can to keep from suffering any more embarrassment. I’m sorry, I was willing to give you some benefit of the doubt up to this point, but this is just breathtaking in its sheer stupidity. I give you high marks for chutzpah, however. You have truly mastered the art of destroying a straw man. But I venture to say that no one with an IQ above room temperature is going to be the least bit fooled by this handwaving silliness. Bravissimo!

Comment #810

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 09:06 PM (e) (s)

Ed,

50 posts. That’s quite impressive. I sort of figured from your earlier tone that you would eventually find some way to be jump ship and give up on any substantial argument. I thought surely that you would eventually quit beating up the strawman you made and address my core argument but I see that is not within your ability.

Is using supernatural to describe the mind “anachronistic?” Possibly, though its still applicable. But let’s be honest. If I had used the term “preternatural” you wouldn’t have understood what I was talking about (I’m not saying you are dumb just that you haven’t shown much ability to understand what I’ve been arguing — even after I’ve repeatedly pointed it out to you). Besides, even if you had looked it up in the dictionary  I would have had to explain how it relates to the case against assuming MN.

Honestly, Ed, if you don’t take me seriously I could really care less. I’d be more than happy to keep corresponding with your commentors, many of whom seem to at least grasp what is being said even if they don’t agree with me. If not they can follow me to my blog and we’ll carry on the conversation there.

Comment #812

Posted by Pim van Meurs on April 7, 2004 09:24 PM (e) (s)

Joe: If the experiment shows that the structure was produced by natural selection then it would prove the ID’s hypothesis was false.

But I argue that this is not an ID hypothesis but rather an anti Darwinian hypothesis. All it does is either show problems with Darwinian hypothesis or strengthen it. That should not be confused with pro-ID in any form although some of the ID proponents seem to have used this fallacy.

Comment #814

Posted by Matthew Heaney on April 7, 2004 09:44 PM (e) (s)

Joe said:

<i>This entire exercise is to get people to understand that their view of MN is based on an a priori rather than an a posteriori reasoning (we’ll have to come back to the issue of why it matters once this is resolved). Your comment provides an excellent example of what I am referring to. Say for the sake of argument that God exists and that he caused a miracle (an action caused by non-naturalistic means) to occur. Now if we take the assumption that all events must be explainable using MN then we would have to conclude that the event was a natural occurrence even though we “know” this is false.</i>

<i>If we have no alternative to MN and it cannot be used to detect supernatural phenomena then we will have a false explanation for the event that occurred. By sticking to our method we would lose the truth. While we may good a posteriori reasons for believing MN is a valid methodology we would have to concede that it could lead us to believe false theories.</i>

The problem with this argument is that even if were to allow for direct intervention by God in our explanations of observed phenomena (that is, we didn’t use MN), there’s still no way for us to tell whether God really did intervene.

Joe’s assumption is that God’s fingerprints are visible by us.  But that assumption is incorrect.  We as human observers don’t stand in the priveleged position that allows us to tell the difference between that nature does all by herself, vs. what happens when God intervenes directly. 

Science is all about prediction and control.  It’s not about metaphysics.  Nature comes with knobs and dials, and all a scientific theory can do is tell you that when you turn the knob by this much, then the dial will move by this much.  We as human observers can’t know the ontological reason why the needle of the dial moves as it does, but science does allow us to predict when and by how much it will move, when we turn the knob. 

You can spot the mistake when Joe used the phrase “lose the truth.”  Scientific theories are simply models, not descriptions of ontic reality.  Like all models, they aren’t true or false, only more or less useful.  For example we know that Newton’s laws don’t accurately predict the motion of the planet Mercury (Einstein figured out that Newton’s laws break down when you’re near a large mass as the Sun), but they’re good enough for most purposes.

Joe appears to be a realist.  This is to be expected, since most theists (especially Philip Johnson, who started all this MN vs. PN business) are realists.  In constrast, science is essentially anti-realist.  It’s the difference between Platonism and positivism.

To understand what theistic realism is, read interviews with Don Cupitt, who is a theistic instrumentalist.  See the article here:

<a href=”http://www.philosophers.co.uk/portal_article.php?id=43…“>http://www.philosophers.co.uk/portal_article.php?id=43&l…;

If you can get your head around instruementalism, then you’ll realize that scientific models aren’t objective, they’re intersubjective.  That’s what is means for science to be a process conducted by a community of human scientist-observers.

Asking whether a scientific theory as evolution is “true” means you don’t really understand the nature of scientific theories.  If there is a clash between science and religion, it is a clash between intersubjectivity and objectivity.  But as George Lakoff explained in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, objectivity is a myth.  That’s the source of the tension for theists, who still cling to an objectivist model.

The real problem for theists is epistemological, not scientific.  The theory of evolution should be the least of their worries.  Serious theologians like Nancey Murphy and Ernan McMullen already understand this.  But most theists have been so preoccupied by the Darwinian revolution they don’t seem to be aware how much of a threat cognitive science is.

Comment #815

Posted by Ian Musgrave on April 7, 2004 10:21 PM (e) (s)

Joe wrote:

<i>Before you let loose with a knee-jerk disagreement, let me clarify that the under a strict materialism (which is what you claim that science must adhere to) the mind (as opposed to the physical brain) is an epiphenomenon and not composed of matter. It is, therefore, is an example of supernatural phenomena (or at least preternatural, which would still put it outside the realm of MN).</i>

As the resident neuroscientist here, let me weigh in briefly.

Firstly, strict materialism <b>isn’t</b> the same as methodological naturalism. Science recognizes the existence of fields (and has done so for over a century), and fields are not composed of matter (under the standard model, most of these fields turn out to be mediated by gauge particles, but science has no problem with non-material filed <i>per se</i>, and gravitational fields remain decidedly non material for the moment). Both science and methodological naturalism have no problem with non-material things, just so long as they are testable, as gravitational fields are.

Secondly “mind” may be an epiphenomenon, but science, and “methodological naturalism” has no problem with epiphenomena, they are firmly embedded in the natural world. Otherwise you would have to argue that the intricate patterns produced as an epiphenomenon of the <a>Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction </a> are supernatural. Similarly you would have to say that the complex emergent behaviours of insects and sea slugs that are epiphenomena of forming simple neuronal circuits are supernatural. You might object that sea slugs don’t have “minds”, but the criteria were epiphenomena not composed of matter, and their behaviours are epiphenomena not composed of matter. Conversely, chimpanzees have minds, not as fully featured as ours (cue chimp grammar debates), but minds none the less. Are chimpanzee minds supernatural? Do you really want to maintain that? And if you do, how do you handle the fact that “methodological naturalist scientists have been happily studying chimp minds for decades.

Finally, “mind” may be an epiphenomenon, but it is firmly rooted in very material cells and chemicals. We can manipulate mind states with chemistry, magnetic fields (are these supernatural?), surgery and brain trauma, all rather prosaically material (except the magnetic fields[gauge theory caveat]). Furthermore, mental states are amenable to testing, which is all science cares about. If we can test it, then it is in the realm of science. Quantum entanglement is certifiably spookier than the mind, but science deals with quantum entanglement.

Centuries ago epilepsy was seen as supernatural, demonic possession. Now we know epilepsy is an epiphenomenon of a misfiring set of neurones, controllable by drugs and curable in some cases by surgery. Science and “methodological naturalism” removed epilepsy from the domain of the supernatural, but you want to return it there.

Comment #816

Posted by Joe Carter on April 7, 2004 10:46 PM (e) (s)

Matthew: You make some great points. <i>
“The real problem for theists is epistemological, not scientific. The theory of evolution should be the least of their worries.</i>

I agree. We should spend more time explaining how naturalism is self-refuting than worrying about evoltionary theories.

<i>…revolution they don’t seem to be aware how much of a threat cognitive science is.</i>

I’m not sure what you mean by this.

Ian: You also make a great point and provide an excellent example of how science “moves the goalposts” when it comes to what is and is not “natural phenonmena.”

<i>Science and “methodological naturalism” removed epilepsy from the domain of the supernatural, but you want to return it there.</i>

No, actually, I don’t. All I really want is for people to drop their illusions. What they believe about science, in my opinion, has less to do with a particular methodology than it does about the underlying philosophy.

Comment #820

Posted by Pim van Meurs on April 7, 2004 11:20 PM (e) (s)

Joe: What they believe about science, in my opinion, has less to do with a particular methodology than it does about the underlying philosophy.

Is that not projecting your own views onto others? Any particular examples relevant to science that you would want to present?

Methodological naturalism is so succesful because it works. ID is such a failure because it cannot live up to its claims and has yet to show itself scientifically relevant.

Does this mean that ID is incorrect? Of course not. Just scientifically irrelevant.

Comment #823

Posted by Ian Musgrave on April 8, 2004 12:16 AM (e) (s)

Joe wrote:

<i>Either the bacterial flagellum is irreducibly complex or it is not. If the experiment shows that the structure was produced by natural selection then it would prove the ID’s hypothesis was false.</i>

Well, as the bacterial flagellum is composed of essentially 8 proteins, it’s not a big deal in terms of irreducible complexity. Furthermore, the flagellar whip, basal proteins and the motor protein are homologous to the equivalent proteins in the type IV pilus responsible for gliding motility, so it would only take a small change to go from pilus retraction to pilus rotation, you don’t even have to add any new structures, just slightly alter the ratchet structure in the type IV pilus. The type IV pilus in turn is clearly derived from the type II secretory system, which uses related motor and basal proteins, and the secretory plunger is homologous to the pilus. No big deal here.

Oh, you meant the <b>eu</b>bacterial flagella, sorry, but there is more than one bacterial flagellum system, completely unrelated to each other.  I thought you were talking about the interesting one.  Now the eubacterial flagellum is a virulence protein secretion system; if you paralyse it, it still secretes virulence proteins, if you chop off the flagella whip, it still secretes virulence proteins. Doesn’t look very IC to me. Indeed, if you get a copy of this paper, (Daniell SJ, et al., The filamentous type III secretion translocon of enteropathogenic Escherichia coli. Cell Microbiol. 2001 Dec;3(12):865-71) and look at the electron micrograph of the type III secretory system here, you would be flat out telling the difference between it and a flagella, it’s only missing the motor protein, which is a member of a ubiquitous class of motor proteins which run other secretory systems (including a gliding motility system, which looks very like a type III secretion system, how about that), so what’s the probability that a secretory motor protein could associate with a secretory system?

Oh, and if you paralyse a bacteria, and expose it to selection for motility, it does evolve a complex motility system. See Velicer GJ, Yu YT. Evolution of novel cooperative swarming in the bacterium Myxococcus xanthus. Nature. 2003 Sep 4;425 (6953):75-8.

Useful web resources:
<a> My page on evolution of bacterial flagella</a>
<a>Nic Matzke’s magisterial review of eubacterial flagella evolution</a>

Comment #824

Posted by Ian Musgrave on April 8, 2004 12:52 AM (e) (s)

Joe wrote:

<i>Ian: You also make a great point and provide an excellent example of how science “moves the goalposts” when it comes to what is and is not “natural phenonmena.” </i>

What goal post moving? Scientists investigated epilepsy, and found that it was produced by natural causes. They didn’t change the definition of natural cause or supernatural agency. They didn’t have to invent <i>new</i> natural causes. This example stands as a full refutation of your argument.

<i><b>Science and “methodological naturalism” removed epilepsy from the domain of the supernatural, but you want to return it there. </b></i>

<i>No, actually, I don’t. All I really want is for people to drop their illusions. What they believe about science, in my opinion, has less to do with a particular methodology than it does about the underlying philosophy. </i>

Your opinion is incorrect. There is an enormous literature on scientific methodology, but one only has to briefly peruse the scientific literature on mind (or any other epiphenomenon) to see that you are incorrect. Again, I will point out that I am a working neuroscientist, a member of and regular presenter at the Australian Neuroscience Society, not to mention the odd international neuroscience meeting, and I can tell you that no neuroscientist thinks that mind is a supernatural thing, but very firmly in the realm of the natural. You may have your own private definition, but neither scientists nor philosophers agree with you.

Comment #825

Posted by Richard Wein on April 8, 2004 03:26 AM (e) (s)

Regardless of whether science requires a principle of methodological naturalism, the issue is a red herring.

First, the IDists themselves claim that their argument only points to intelligent design, not supernatural design. So methodological naturalism does not rule out ID. Indeed, IDists themselves  point out correctly that inferences involving intelligent (human) design do occur in other fields of science. Their claim that science is ruling out ID in the field of biology as a result of some general rule is inconsistent with this observation.

Second, whatever some scientists may say when they are in a mood to philosophise, the reality is that they follow the evidence wherever it leads. Of course, I’m not saying that scientists never make mistakes or allow themselves to be swayed by prejudices. Scientists are humans too. But the idea that most scientists would, as a matter of principle, reject a certain type of explanation even if the evidence clearly pointed to it seems to me absurd. Scientists reject ID in biology because there is no evidence of it.

Third, contrary to the claims of Beckwith and Van Dyke, critic of ID have not rejected it without consideration of the arguments. The arguments for ID have been critiqued in many articles (including some by me). It turns out that the main argument for ID is just the old God-of-the-gaps argument dressed up in misleading pseudoscientific mumbo jumbo.

The alternative methodology which IDists would like science to adopt is not one which considers all explanations (natural and supernatural) on an equal basis. In reality they want ID to be given preferential treatment. See the articles by Dembski and Behe in which they insist that “naturalistic” accounts of evolution must be given in exhaustive detail before they can be considered adequate, while insisting that ID be accepted despite an utter lack of any details whatsoever.

Comment #828

Posted by Ian Musgrave on April 8, 2004 05:12 AM (e) (s)

Joe wrote:

<I>I disagree. Forensic science provides explanatory theories and it doesn’t rely on methodological naturalism.</I>

Even <b>if</b> minds were supernatural (which they are not) forensics, anthropology etc. still proceed through ordinary “methodological naturalism”. Take a recent real case. Researchers found piles of stones in the rainforest. They wanted to know if these were hammer stones accumulated by an intelligent agent, or just accumulations of stones produced by standard geological processes.  They examined the stones for use marks, wear patters associated with hammerstone use, and watch intelligent agents behaviour with regard to hammer stones (they tended to pile used hammerstones up in one spot). Similarly, when they looked at accumulations of stones produced by normal geological processes in rainforests, the stones were not of the number nor size distribution of the caches, n